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E. P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class is the obligatory starting point 
for any contemporary discussion of the history of working-class formation.' The general 
transformation and revitalization of labor history over the past two decades can be read as a 
dialogue with Thompson; The Making effectively set the agenda for an entire generation of labor 
historians. 
It is worth recalling how much this book enriched and enlarged our conception of working- 
class history. In the two or three decades prior to its publication in 1963, studies of the working 
class had been confined primarily to four established genres: histories of labor unions and labor 
parties, biographies of labor leaders, histories of socialist doctrines, and investigations of 'the 
condition of the workers', conceived almost exclusively as a question of the rise or fall in workers' 
material standards of living. My first reading of The Making, when I was a graduate student a t  
Berkeley in 1964, produced a kind of revelation. I was already dissatisfied with the narrow focus 
of most existing labor history and detennined to find some way to get a t  a broader range of 
workers' experiences. Yet I was astounded by the sheer mass of 'ethnographic' detail about 
workers that Thompson had collected. Thompson's version of working-class history included not 
only trade unions, socialist doctrines, and real wages, but popular political and religious traditions, 
workshop rituals, back-room insurrectionary conspiracies, popular ballads, millenarian preaching, 
anonymous threatening letters, Methodist hymns, dog fights, trade festivals, country dances, 
strike fund subscription lists, beggarsy tricks, artisans' houses of call, the iconography of trade 
banners, farmers' account books, weavers' gardens, and so on in endless profusion. For me 
personally, and for a whole generation of young historians, the horizons of working-class history -- 
and of history in general -- were suddenly and enormously expanded. We were launched by 
Thompson into the major historiographical project of the past twenty years -- 'history from below'. 
This revolutionary enlargement of the scope of working-class history has been Thompson's 
greatest achievement. 2 
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In The Making, Thompson avoids explicit statement of his theoretical argument about 
class formation - except, in somewhat cryptic form, in his preface. At the time, he was in full 
flight from Stalinist formalism, and did not want his readers to be able to reduce his book to a set 
of abstract propositions.3 His crucial contention was that the emergence of the working class was 
a product of the complex and contradictory experience of workers in the turbulent years from 
1790 to 1832, and that it could not be understood apart from that experience. The genius of his 
long, sprawling, picaresque, Dickensian narrative was to give his readers some semblance of the 
workers' experience -- to make them participate vicariously in the suffering, the heroism, the 
tedium, the outrage, the sense of loss and the sense of discovery that constituted the formation of 
the working class. The result is the greatest literary tour de force in recent historiography. 
The narrative is, to be sure, informed by theoretical notions about class formation, but 
theory is usually present by implication, woven i n b  and only occasionally emerging out of 
Thompson's rich tapestry of working-class experience. Thompson's one explicit theoretical 
statement in the book -- his preface -- has been enormously influential; it may be the most 
frequently .cited preface since Marx7s preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy. It has been a potent resource for validating historical approaches to class and a ready 
argument against any simple-minded economic determinism. It  has also formed a handy 
authorized interpretation of the theoretical implications of a book whose scale, complexity, 
denseness, and resolute concreteness make the drawing of such implications difficult. But in spite 
of the preface's import&ce, much of what Thompson says there is either unclear or theoretically 
problematic. Moreover, the preface is by no means a sufficient theoretical account of his historical 
practice. Some of the most important implicit theoretical innovations of The Making remain 
completely unvoiced in its preface. ' 
The object of this chapter is to s&te and evaluate Thompson's theory of class formation. I 
shall subject Thompson's explicit theory, mainly as set forth in his preface, to.a close reading and 
critical analysis, attempting to demonstrate its inadequacy both as a theory and as an account of 
what he has achieved in his book. I shall also attempt to tease a t  least some implicit theoretical 
notions out of his narrative of class formation, and to suggest my own amendments, critiques, and .- 
- t  
reformulations. This entire exercise should perhaps be seen as  an  effort to explain to myself how 
and why- I have always found this extraordinary book a t  once deeply inspiring and deeply 
mystifying. 
The theory of class formation in Thompson's preface 
I shall try to set forth the major theoretical propositions contained in the preface of The -
Making briefly and somewhat formally. 
(1) Class is an historical phenomenon. In opposition to the deductive formalism of 
Stalinists and the static definitions of structural-functional sociologists, Thompson insists that 
class is essentially historical. 
I do not see class as a 'structure', nor even as a 'category', but as something which in fact 
happens (and c& be shown to have happened) in human relationships.* 
If we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes but simply a multitude of 
individuals with a multitude of experiences. But if we watch these men over an adequate 
period of social change, we observe patterns in their relationships, their ideas, and their 
institutions. Class is defined by men as  they live their own history, and, in the end, this is 
its only def in i t i~n .~  . . 
... The notion of class entails the notion of historical relationship. Like any other 
relationship, it is a fluency which evades analysis' if we attempt to stop it dead at any 
given moment and anatomize its structure. 6 
These passages enunciate a vigorous conception of the essential historicity of class. For Thompson 
class exists only in time, and consequently can only be known historically. Non-historical 
approaches to class necessarily distort, perhaps even obliterate, their object. 
(2) Class is an outcome of experience. Thompson's insistence on the primacy of 
experience in class formation was a reaction against Stalinist formulations, which tended to be 
highly abstract and deductive. Thompson characterized Stalinist practice as follows: 
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'It,' the working class, is assumed to have a real existence, which can be defined almost 
mathematically -- so many men who stand in a certain relation to the means of production. 
Once this is assumed it becomes possible to deduce the class-consciousness which 'it' ought 
to have (but seldom does have) if 'it' was properly aware of its own position and real 
interests. 
Thompson took the opposite tack, insisting, as we have seen, that 'class is defined by men as they 
live their own history, and, in the end, this is its only definition'. 'Experience', I would argue, is 
the central -- and the most problematic -- theoretical concept in The Making, as well as the key to 
it& narrative strategy. Thompson's discovery and adumbration of working-class experience, his 
ability to ferret out, interpret, and convey the textures and meanings of working-class lives, is the 
greatest triumph of his book. 
(3) Workers are  active and conscious participants in class formation. The Making, as 
Thompson puts it, 'is a study of an active process,. which, owes as much ,to agency as to 
. . 
conditioning. The working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. It  was present at 
its own making'.8 That this now seems self-evident is an  indication of The Making's influence. 
At the time Thompson wrote, most Marxist argumentation about class formation was highly 
determinist: factories produced a proletariat almost as mechanically as  they produced cloth or 
rails. Even non-Stalinist labor historians showed little curiosity about what workers actually felt, 
said, wrote, and did. The conventional forms of historiography enabled them to write biographies 
of Fergus O'Connor or Jeah Jaures, or to write institutional histories of trade unions or the 
Independent Labor Party, but before Thompson no one knew how to write the history of a - class. 
One of Thompson's lasting contributions to historiography was to show how workers could be 
givenvoices and wills and could be constituted as a collective agent in an historical narrative.' 
(4) Class is defined by consciousness. 'Class,' Thompson m t e s ,  happens when some 
men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), - feel and articulate h e  identity of 
their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different 
from (and usually opposed to) theirs.'' 
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It is not the 'objective' identity of interests that makes a class, but rather' the feeling and 
articulating of 'an identity. No consciousness, no class. Once again, this point is part of 
Thompson's polemic against Stalinism, which, he claims, defined class 'mathematically' as 'so 
many men who stand in a certain relation to the means of production,' and then deduced class 
consciousness from this definition. l1 Thompson, by denying that class exists apart from real 
people's consciousness awareness of their common interests, radically shifted the problematic of 
class formation by pushing to the fore the question of how this awareness came about historically. 
Class consciousness became not a corollary deducible from the real (economic) existence of class, 
but rather an  historical achievement of workers who pondered their experiences and who 
constructed (with the collaboration of sympathetic intellectuals) a vocabulary and conceptual 
framework through which their identity as a class could be thought and actualized. 
A Critique of Thompson's Theory . 
These four propositions form the core of Thompson's theory. Taken together they mark a 
signif~cant reworking of the problematic of class formation -- one. whose overall value as a 
stimulus to research and as a corrective to pre-existing approaches can hardly be disputed. Yet 
what Thompson's. preface provides is less a systematic alternative theory of class formation than 
a set of admonitions whose value is largely determined by their place in a specific polemic. 
Thompson admonishes us to avoid sterile formalisms and to be ever aware that the 'making' of 
the working class was a temporal human process, lived out in the experiences of real men and 
women. But he tells us very little about how we might structure an account of class formation 
theoretically - or, indeed, about how he has structured his own account. In fact, as I shall argue 
below, Thompson implicitly assumes the essential correctness of precisely the .theory of class 
formation that he seems to be denying. Thompson's explicit theoretical reflections are so fmed 
upon his polemical opponent that he fails to articulate his own transcendence of classical Marxism. 
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Determination 
Thompson's entanglement with his polemical opponent is nowhere clearer than in his 
statements about determination. His championing of working-class agency and his rejection of the 
classical Marxist metaphor of the determining economic base and the determined cultural and 
political superstructure has done much to free labor history from the bonds of a rigid economic 
determinism. Yet Thompson's own theory of how class formation is determined remains highly 
ambiguous. His most general statement is in the preface of The Making. 
Class happens when some men, as.a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), 
feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against 
other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs. The class 
experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born -- or 
enter involuntarily. Classconsciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled 
in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms. If 
the experience appears as determined, class consciousness does not. We can see a  lo^& in 
the responses of similar occupational groups undergoing similar experiences, but we cannot 
predicate any law. Consciousness of class arises in the same way in different times and 
places, but never in&t the same way.12 
For all its particular accents, this passage appears to.be stating a theory of determination 
of a recognizeably Marxist type. Economic relations (or class-in-itself) generate a set of class 
experiences, and these experiences give rise to class-consciousness (class-for-itself). In its general 
form, this is very close to the classical Marxist formulation -- say in the Communist Manifesto -- 
where exploitative capitalist economic relations give rise to class struggles through which the 
proletariat becomes conscious of itself as a class with the historical destiny of abolishing the 
exploitation of man by man. But there are important differences. 
First, for Thompson it is class experience that provides the historical mediation between 
productive relations and class consciousness, whereas for classical Marxism it is class struggle. 
Class struggle - political movements, union organizing, strikes and boycotts -- is a crucially 
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important form of class experience for Thompson. But his notion of class experience is vastly 
broader. It includes the whole range of workers' subjktive responses to their exploitation -- not 
only in movements of struggle, but in their families and communities, in. their leisure-time 
activities, in their religious. practices and beliefs, in their workshops and weaving-sheds, and so on. 
Between the hard facts of productive relations and the discovery of class-consciousness ,lies the 
vast, multiple, contradictory realm of experience, not the neat and unidirectional process of 
learning-the-truth-through-struggle posited by classical Marxism. 
Thompson's second difference from classical Marxism, not surprising given the 
amorphousness of his mediating term, is a much looser theory of determination. The process of 
class formation is not driven by inexorable laws of history. Class experience, he a f f i s ,  & 
determined by the productive relations into which men are born or enter involuntarily - although 
he qualifies this determination with the modifiers 'largely' or 'appears as'. The way these 
experiences are 'handled in cultural terms' is determined far more loosely. I t  is, apparently, in 
the cultural handling of class experience that human agency enters the picture decisively -- with 
the consequence that we can predicate no 'lawy of the development of class-consciousness. A 
weaker form of determination is retained, however: there is some sort of parallel 'logic' a t  work in 
the development of class consciousness even if there is .!no 'law'. Thompson keeps the 
directionality of the classical Marxist account -- the causation moves from economic relations, to 
social experience, and thence to consciousness. But the determination is much weaker -- 
productive relations determine experience largely, but presumably not fully, and class experience 
determines consciousness yet more loosely. Thompson's account leaves plenty of room, within 
broadly determined limits, for the exercise of human agency and the vagaries of human 
experience. 
But in spite of his denial of a base-superstructure model of society, Thompson really offers 
no alternative to an  economic determinist theory of class formation. He assigns a sigdicant role 
to human agency and experience, but this simply loosens the causal linkages to the form of 
probabilistic laws rather than absolute 'iron laws'; no noneconomic cause of the rise of class 
consciousness~is introduced into the account, simply a variation in how consciousness will arise in 
different times and places. Moreover, in this sketch of the class-formation process, Thompson 
implicitly affums what he elsewhere denids: that class is in fact present in the economic structure 
independently of the workers' consciousness or lack of consciousness of class. If workers' 
experiences produce class-consciousness, rather than some other sort of consciousness, this is 
because their experiences are &s experiences. And if' these class experiences are determined, as  
Thompson asserts, by productive relations, then these productive relations must be class 
productive relations, prior, in a logical sense, to the class experiences which they generate. And if 
the class-consciousness that arises the same way in different times and places follows a single 
logic, this implies that the class experiences, and hence the class productive relations that 
determine them, must have an even more unifed single logic. In short, we are led to capitalism 
as conceived by Marx - a system of productive relations with a unitary logic wherever it appears. 
Now this ought to be perfectly acceptable in a Marxist work, but it in fact puts Thompson in a 
very tight conceptual spot. If he intends this sort of account of class formation, how can he deny 
that class exists in the pxoductive relations themselves? It seems utterly metaphysical and 
arbitrary to deny the presence of class in the productive relations yet affirm its presence in the 
experiences and the consciousness that those productive relations generate. 
Thompson's explanatory account of class formation, thus, turns out to contradict implicitly 
certain of his major theoretical propositions. In his Thompson attempts to outline a novel 
approach that assigns a much than usual role to experience, agency, and consciousness, 
and that abandons the deductive base-superstructure model of his Stalinist-Marxist predecessors. 
But he also, in the passage I have been analyzing here, embraces the old determinist model even 
while he is attempting to surpass it. The classical Marxist schemas of base-superstructure and 
the movement from class-in-itself to class-for-itself thus implicitly underlie and structure his 
account of working-class experience, agency, and consciousness, but do so in unacknowledged and 
unexamined fashion. 
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This problem appears in The Making on a narrative and empirical as  well as a theoretical 
level. Although Thompson explicitly disavows economic determinism, he also assumes it as a kind 
of unconscious rhetorical backdrop against which specific empirical accounts of working-class 
experience, agency, and consciousness are placed and assigned their sigdicance. Or, change 
the metaphor, economic determinism acts in The Making as a kind of hidden dynamo that, 
unknown to the actors and felt rather than seen by the. author and reader, propels the narrative in 
a certain direction. By suppressing but u.xiconsciously retaining economic determinism, Thompson 
cleared a vast narrative space that could be filled almost exclusively by specific accounts of 
working-class experience, agency, and consciousness, untroubled by,. yet globally shaped by, the 
underlying rhythm of a classical Marxist movement from class-in-itself to class-for-itself. The 
result is an account of class formation that, for all its empirical richness and persuasive power, 
remains elusive and mystifying. 
Diachrony and synchrony 
Thompson's statements about 'the historicity of class afe in many ways parallel to his 
statements about determination; once again, his polemical zeal leads him to deny in his theory 
what he is unable to deny in his practice. Thompson's ksertion of the essential historicity of class 
implies an extremely radical - in my opinion quite untenable -- ontological and epistemological 
position. He appears to be saying not only that class comes into being through a historical ' 
process, but that it only exists over time. ('If we stop history a t  a given point there are no 
classes....') As an ontological commitment this is perhaps acceptable -- in some sense nothing -
exists except in time. But Thompson appears to draw from this the dubious epistemological 
conclusion that no synchronic analysis of class can be valid. (Class 'evades analysis if we attempt 
..to stop i t  dead a t  any given moment and anatomize its structure'.) 
This, I think, is mistaken. While class exists ib time, it is also necessary as a moment in 
any adequate historical analysis of class & stop or bracket time, to look a t  class as a set of 
synchronic relations - between individuals, between various groups of workers, between workers 
and their employers, between workers and the means of production, between workers and . 
. . 
available ideologies, etc. In contrast to Thompson, I would argue that the notion of relationship, 
which he takes as implying fluency, is in fact profoundly synchronic. To call class a relationship is 
to imply that we cannot capture it through a purely diachronic narration of events, but that we 
must pause now and again to describe it as a structure - one that, to be sure, crystallizes out of 
events and will be transformed by subsequent events. In his polemic against the ahistorical 
conceptions of Stalinism and structural-functionalism, Thompson appears to have gone beyond the 
sound position of insisting that an account of class must maintain a dialectic between synchronic 
and diachronic approaches to embrace pure diachrony. 
A moment's thought about the text of The Making makes it evident that Thompson's own 
historical practice is very far from pure diachrony. To begin with, Thompson's Dickensian 
narrative style, with its omniscient narrator commenting self-consciously oli events, is hardly well 
adapted to pure diachrony. Thompson's theoretical position, if taken seriously, would imply a 
style of narration more akin to Virginia Woolfs or Robbe-Grille's.13 Moreover, Thompson's text 
is in fact densely interwoven with synchronic analyses. This is not to say that Thompson 'stops 
time' in some literal sense in his text. What we mean when we say that a historian 'stops time' is 
that she momentaril; suspends time by abstracting some pattern, structure, or relationship out of 
.. . the flow of events in order to contemplate, categorize, anatomize, or construct it in her mind and 
in her text. The pattern, structure, or relationship will normally be constructed from bits of 
evidence whose creation was not literally simultaneous but which in some sense fit together, 
constitute a whole. Certainly Thompson does this in his brilliant analysis of London artisans 
when he uses Mayhew's observations from 1849 and 1850 as evidence about the distinction 
between honorable and dishonorable trades in London in the teens and the twenties. l4 This move 
is legitimate only because he is building up a synchronic picture of a structure that he regards as 
having endured in a t  least important essentials for several decades. In short, Thompson's text, 
more than many historical texts, is punctuated by synchronic analyses, in spite of his theoretical 
advocacy of pure diachrony. 
One might well object that Thompson is no philosopher, and that he surely does not intend 
to rule out the kind of practical dialectic between synchrony and diachrony that characterizes his 
own text. Why should we hold Thompson to the literal meaning of the statements he makes in his 
preface? But the preface is only one instance of a pervasive theme in Thompson's writings -- an 
adamant refusal of deductive theory that is stated most eloquently (and most brutally) in his 
attack on Althusser in The Poverty of  heo or^.'^ Whatever one thinks about the relative merits 
of Althusser and Thompson (if forced to choose I would unhesitatingly take Thompson) it should be 
noted that Thompson's position tends consistently to stigmatize explicit synchronic theorization as  
illegitimate and unhistorical while refusing to recognize the no less synchronic character of the 
implicit theorizations in his own narratives. Thompson therefore refuses the possibility of a 
rational confrontation between his own theories and those of his opponents, in effect ruling them 
out of court on procedural grounds. In this sense, Thompson's passionate embrace of radical 
diachrony is as mystifying as his unfulfilled renunciation of a base-superstructure model of 
determination. 
Experience 
If the rich narrative portrayal of working-class experience is the great triumph of - The 
Making,. the heavy explanatory load placed on the concept of experience is, in my opinion, The 
Making's cardinal weakness.16 The meaning of the term 'experience' is so intrinsically 
amorphous that it is difficult to assign it any delimitable role hi a theory of class formation, and 
Thompson makes matters worse by using it in inconsistent and confusing ways. Quite explicitly 
in his essay 'Folklore, Anthropology, and Social History', and at least implicitly in the preface to 
The Making, Thompson presents experience as mediating between productive relations and class 
consciousness, or between 'social being' and 'social consc i~usness ' .~~  The problem with such a 
formulation is that experience appears to encompasses both the terms between which it is 
supposed to mediate. Do 'productive relations' or 'social being' or 'consciousness' exist outside of 
experience? Any 'social being' that exists outside of experience would have to be a synchronic 
s t rucwe  of the kind whose existence Thompson explicitly denies. And consciousness that exists 
outside of experience would be the kind of deduced consciousness that Stalinists had attributed to 
the working class. One major triumph of Thompson's narrative of English working-class 
formation is to portray productive relations not as a n  abstraction but as the experiences of real 
men and women. This, it seems to me, is the principal achievement of Part Two of The Making 
('The Curse of Adam'). Likewise the 'Class Consciousnessy described in the final chapter is not a 
set of abstract and logical doctrines that workers ought to have held, but the concrete experience 
of radicals, journalists, autodidact workers, and Owenites who wrote and read tracts, handbills, 
and newspaper articles or made speeches in the context of their own political and social struggles 
and who practiced class-consciousness in their own lives. In short, in spite of Thompson's explicit 
claims to the contrary, experience cannot play a mediating role in his account of English working- 
class formation because for him working-class formation is nothing but experience. 
If experience is a medium ir. The Making, it is a medium not in the sense of 'a substance 
through which a force .acts or an effect .is transmittedy (this, Webster's second meaning, would 
cover mediation between being and consciousness) but 'that through which or by which anything is 
accomplished' (Webster's third meaning).18 Rather than mediating between social being and 
consciousness, experience appears in ~ h o m ~ s o n ' s  account as the medium in which theoretical 
structures are realized (even though Thompson officially denies that these structures exist). The 
class relations tacitly posited as present in the material base are realized in the medium of human 
experience - experience of productive relations, of struggles, and of consciousness. A tacitly 
posited synchronic structure works itself out in the real, historical, experienced lives of human 
actors. 
This interpretation of experience as medium see- authorized by a passage in The 
Poverty of Theory where Thompson reflects on the accomplishments of the English Marxist 
historians (and pre-eminently, it seems clear, of The Makine). 'We explored', he says, 'those 
junction concepts (such as "need", "class", and "determine") by which, through the missing term, 
9 19 "experience", structure is transmuted into process, and the subject reenters into history. 
14 
Here, quite unambiguously, experience appears as the medium through which structure is realized 
in actual historical human subjects. 
The precise nature of the 'structure' and the way it is realized in experience is not clear in 
this sentence. But these questions are elaborated on thereafter in a complex and murky passage, 
which must be quoted at some length. 
And a t  'experience' we [that is, the English Marxist historians] were led on to re-examine 
all those dense, complex and elaborated systems by which familial and social life is 
structured and social consciousness frnds realization and expression (systems which the 
very rigor of the discipline in Ricardo or in the Marx of Capital is designed to exclude): 
kinship, custom, the invisible and visible rules of social regulation, hegemony and 
deference, symbolic forms of domination and of resistance, religious faith and millenarid 
impulses, manners, law, institutions and ideologies -- all of which, in their sum, comprise 
the 'genetics' of the whole historical process, all of them joined, a t  a certain point, in 
common human experience, which itself (as distinctive experiences) exerts pressure 
on the sum. 2 0 
The very opacity and contradictions of this passage are revealing. At f r s t  Thompson 
seems to be saying that those 'dense, complex and elaborated systems' which could not be 
understood within the traditional Marxist framework were themselves structures, more or less 
parallel to the structures (that is, modes of production) which could be grasped in Marxist terms. 
They are, at least, presented as having the power to structure social life and as being realized in 
social consciousness. Then he seems to say that these structures must all be understood purely 
under the category of experience. They are, a t  least, all 'joined ...in common human experience.' 
Thompson then equates this common human experience (made up, remember, of that long string 
of 'systems' beginning with 'kinship' and ending with 'ideology') with 'distinctive - class 
experiences'. In other words, Marxist historians, pursuing an analysis centered on the mode of 
production, encounter in their research a series of systems that are not reducible to modes of 
production. But these systems, which together constitute a redm of 'experience,' turn out to have 
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in common the fact that they are all class experiences. And since class is itself ultimately 
determined by the mode of production, this implies that systems not reducible to the mode of 
production are, nevertheless, in some sense attributable precisely to the mode of production. The 
passage, in short, seems utterly contradictory. 
A clearer but no less distressing picture begins to emerge in the very next paragraph. 
But, in my view, we did not discover other, and co-existent, systems, of equal status and 
coherence to the system of (anti) Political Economy, exerting co-equal pressures: a Kinship 
Mode, a Symbolic Mode, an Ideological Mode, etc. 'Experience' (we have found) has, in the 
last instance, been generated in 'material life', has been structured in class ways, and 
hence 'social being' has determined 'social consciousness'. La Structure still dominates 
experience but from that point of view her determinate influence is weak. For any living 
generation, in any 'now', the ways in which they 'handle' experience defies prediction and 
escapes from any narrow definition of 
Here Thompson seems to be saying that the systems which constitute the realm of 'experience' 
(that is, kinship, custom, etc.) are not really systems after all, a t  least not of a type parallel to 
modes of production. These various crypto-systems are now portrayed as lacking the 'coherence' 
and the: 'determining pressures' that Thompson attributes 'the system of (anti) Political 
Economy' -- that is Marx's materialist science of the mode of production. He asserts that the 
English Marxist historians have 'found' in their research that experience (including, remember, 
kinship, custom, etc.) has in the last instance been 'generated in "material life"' and 'structured in 
class ways'. These crypto-systems apparently have been found to have no independent causal 
dynamics; hence they can be said to be, ultimately, experienced through class, whence all causal 
pressure flows. The crypto-systems that make up 'experience' are themselves an  inert medium; 
their life is derived entirely from the dynamic of the mode of production. 
But in what sense have the English Marxist historians 'found' this to be true? Not in the . 
usual empirical sense that the science of. the mode of production has accounted for most of the 
observed historical behavior. In fact the empirical frnding Thompson trumpets is just the opposite: 
that the determinate influence of 'La Structure' is - weak. The way in which any living generation' 
handles experience 'defies prediction and escapes from any narrow definition of determination'. 
This is an odd argument from a fervent advocate of empirical investigation and sworn enemy of 
dogmatic a priori theorizing. The weakness of the posited explanation should have driven 
Thompson to consider that the assortment of crypto-structures -- kinship, law, ideology, and so on 
-- might, as he initially suggested, have some independent explanatory power. But Thompson has 
ruled this out, on grounds that, since they obviously are not empirical, must be a priori theoretical. 
Faced with only weak determination by his chosen explanation, he concludes not that other 
systems of determination are also operative, but, since only the mode of production can be 
regarded as determining, that anythmg it cannot explain must be assigned to the vagaries of 
experience -- to the deep complexities of human existence and the unpredictable operation of 
human agency. Ironically, Althusser, with his insistence on the 'relative autonomy' of different 
levels in -a social formation and his notion of 'overdetermination', here turns out to be more flexible 
and less dogmatic than Thompson the antidogmatist defender of empirical knowledge. 
Once again we arrive a t  a.mystification, at bottom the same mystification that ruled out 
yet assumed the determination of the superstructure by the base and that suppressed in principle 
but could riot suppress in fact the importance of 'synchrony in historical analysis. In attempting to 
specify the nature and role of experience, Thompson returns straight to the theoretically excluded 
but in fact unexcludeable a priori Marxist synchronic structure par excellence: the mode of 
production. The vast realms of history not explainable in terms.of the dynamic of the mode of 
production are then relegated to a residual category of 'experience', which is not capable of 
explanation a t  all, or a t  least not in determinate terms. All sorts of systems apparently 
discoverable in human societies are in fact not systems, but part of the murky and complex 
medium of 'experience' -- the balky, effervescent, cranky, resistant, and independent-minded 
human stuff in which the mode of production very incompletely determines history. 
Once again, Thompson's theory obviously does not square with his practice, either in The 
Making or elsewhere. In his narratives, the various crypto-structures appear as anything but 
inert, a s  having their own definable dynamics and their distinct determinate pressures. This is 
perhaps clearest in Whigs and Hunters, where Thompson's eloquent celebration of the 'rule of law' 
argues precisely that law has its own causal force in history.22 But the same observation also 
holds for The Making. Such 'systems' as the Paineite tradition, Methodism, or institutions of 
trade solidarity are not merely media for dynamics originating in the mode of production, but 
palpable causal forces in their own right. By casting all these systems as 'experience,' Thompson 
hides from himself the extent to which his narrative tacitly assumes not only a determination in 
the last instance by the base of productive relations, but also an overdetermination by a whole 
series of relatively autonomous cultural, institutional, and political systems. In this respect, his 
tacit model of the architectonics of society is actually very close to Althusser's. 
Experience Demystified 
Thompson's claims about experience as a theoretical category are so incoherent that one is 
tempted to discard the term entirely. Yet experience seems an appropriate label' for what 
Thompson has captured so brilliantly in his narrative in The Making. It therefore seems 
worthwhile instead to deflate the concept, to clarify it and extract it from the untenable 
philosophical claims Thompson makes for it. Restored to something like its usage in ordinary 
language, experience has a place in the theory of class formation -- and in the theory of historical 
change more generally. . 
The first step is to disengage the notion of experience from the quite distinct problem of 
multiple causation. Deviations of historical events from a strict economic determinist model 
should not automatically be assigned to 'experience', and thereby tacitly explained as 
consequences of an  essentially mysterious .human 'agency'. Much of such deviation can be 
accounted for relatively straight-forwardly as the outcome of causal interactions between a 
diversity of more or less autonomous structures or systems. Experience should be conceptualized 
much more narrowly, in line with Webster's, as  'the actual living through an event or even ts...; 
actual enjoyment or suffering; hence, the effect upon the judgment or feelings produced by 
personal and direct impressio ns...; as to know by experience. '23 Although experience may refer' 
merely to the actual 'living through of events', it ordinarily implies an 'effect 'upon the judgment or 
feelings', with knowledge as a result. When we call an event an experience, we usually mean that 
the person who has enjoyed or suffered the event has reflected upon it. Experience, as Clifford 
Geertz puts it, is something 'construed'.24 Thompson himself, in The Poverty of Theory, a t  one 
point gives a definition of experience very similar to that in Webster's -- before going on to inflate 
and confuse the concept by arguing that it mediates between social being and consciousness. 
'Experience', he says, 'comprises the mental and emotional response, whether of an individual or 
of a social group, to many interrelated events or to many repetitions of the same kind of 
events'.25 This definition is reasonably clear and specific. I t  indicates something important but 
not very mysterious -- that people respond mentally and emotionally, both individually and in 
groups, to what happens to them. 
This also seems consistent with Thompson's practice in The Making. His narrative 
. . 
reconstructs not so much the actual events people lived through as the way .people construed 
events as they were living through them. By patiently assembling the surviving documents and 
carefully attending to judgments- and feelings expressed in them, he has rendered the familiar 
events of early nineteenth-century English history -- Peterloo, the industrial revolution, the 
suspension of habeas corpus, Luddism - as experiences of ordinary people. What makes 
Thompson's account different from those of earlier labor historians is that he enables us to see 
events -- or perhaps we should say creates the narrative illusion that we can see events -- from 
the standpoint of those who lived through them. Thompson's narrative tells us where people are 
coming from; he invariably presents their experience (that is, their emotional and mental response 
to events) as structured - by productive relations, political institutions, habits, traditions, and 
values. What gives Thompson's portrayal of experience such persuasive force is that it is based 
on a structured and explicable, rather than a purely voluntarist and mysterious, concept of 
agency. 
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Thompson is right to insist that his difference with Althusser is profound, but but the 
difference is obscured rather than clarifled by the long discussion of experience in The Poverty of 
~ h k r ~ .  The essential contrast is in their theories of the subjeck In Althusser's theory, subjects 
are deprived of agency; they are reproduced in a rigidly determined fashion by the operation of 
education, the family, religion, and other so-called ideological state apparatuses.26 Althusser's 
theory, as Goran Therborn points out, constitutes subjects so hegemonized by the ideology of the 
ruling class. that they would be incapable of resistance or struggle.27 Thompson develops no 
elaborated theory of the subject, but he spends a lot of time constructing subjects in his narrative, 
and these subjects are utterly different from ~lthusser 's .  They are endowed with agency - not 
with a naive individualist's 'freedom of the will', but with a structured agency. His subjects are 
formed by the various systems or structures that constitute their historical life space; what they 
can think, feel, and do is determined by the fact that they are Methodists, 'free-born Englishmen', 
journeymen in a craft-undergoing degradation, Londoners, and so on. But the determination is not ' 
mechanical. for Thompson's subjects are what Anthony. Giddens calls 'knowledgeable'. They are 
. . 
intelligent and willful human beings, who reflect on the events they live through (that is, have 
experiences) and are capable of acting purposefully and rationally on the basis of their 
experiences, within the constraints imposed and the possibilities opened up by the structures that 
constitute their subjectivity and their environment.28 
I have cast this statement of Thompson's implicit theory of the subject in Giddens' 
theoretical terms because I believe that Giddens' notions of agency &d structure provide a better 
theoretical pivot for Thompson's account of class formation than Thompson's own amorphous 
concept of experience. Giddens incorporates what is useful about Thompson's 'experience': he 
insists that human beings are constantly engaged in 'reflexive monitoring' of both their own and 
others' action, and that their conduct of and understanding of social life grow out of this reflexive 
monitoring.29 But his theory incorporates experience without mystifying the relationship between 
agency and structure. 
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In large part, this is because Giddens develops an .  alternative to the reified Stalinist o i  
Althusserian (or structural-functionalist) concept of structure, whereas Thompson rails against it 
but proposes no alternative. Because he continues to conceive of structure in reified supra-human 
terms, Thompson casts experience and structure as antagonistic principles. The role of experience 
in his theory is to frustrate and blunt structural determination. Giddens, by contrast, de-reifies 
structure, making it no less human than agency. He sees structure and agency not as 
antagonistic but as indissolubly linked: agency and structure 'presuppose one another'. 3 0 
Structures for him are a t  once the medium and the outcome of human interactions. They are 
transformed by agents, but they are also reproduced by agents. Structures are not only 
determining or constraining, but enabling as well: agents could not exist without the structures 
that provide their constraints and possibilities, and structures could not exist without the agents 
who enact and/or transform them. This concept of structure and of its relationship to agency 
requires no mystification to account for the transformative effects of experience. If structures are 
seen as the continuing product of reflexive monitoring in the first place, then it stands to reason 
that changes in structures arise out of the same reflexive monitoring process. 
simply invoking Giddens' theory does not solve all the theoretical problems posed by 
Thompson's account of English working-class formation. It does not tell us when to be abstract 
and when concrete, how to recognize or describe 'structures, or how to constitute appropriately 
knowledgeable agents in our narratives. But I think i t  provides a theoretical vocabulary capable 
of accounting for what Thompson actually achieves in the text of The Working -- a portrayal of 
English workers as  structurally constrained and endowed agents whose experience and 
knowledgeable action produced, in interaction with other agents operating under different 
structural constraints and endowments, a self-conscious working class.31 
One advakage of this theorization of Thompson's history - as an account of structurally 
formed agents enacting and/or transforming structures -- is that it offers a solution to a widely 
recognized weakness in The Making. Thompson's unwillingness to address explicitly the role of 
structures in class formation. Thompson avoids structures because he does not wish to introduce 
any extra-human forces into his account; his critics counter that by concentrating on 'subjective' 
forces, he leaves out the 'objective' forces which in fact play the dominant role in class formation. 
But both Thompson and his critics share the misconception that structures are 'objective' and 
therefore exist a t  a ciifferent ontological level than agents. If we accept Giddens' position on 
structures, then any contrast between- 'objective' and 'subjective' becomes purely methodological. 
Abstraction becomes only a moment in the analysis: a necessary strategic move in any complex 
historical argument. We can introduce structures without ceasing to be ontological humanists, and 
can recognize the efficacy of 'experience' without ruling out a structural argument. 
Culturalism or Experientialism? 
When Thompson's Marxist critics have accused him of insflicient attention to structural 
de.terrninants, they have virtually always had in mind economic determinants. Most Marxists 
implicitly equate structure with economic explanations and agency with ideological or cultural 
explanationi. Hence it is eaiy for Richard Johnson to leap from a cogent critique of Thompson's 
'overbearing stress on "experiencen', to a mistaken indictment of Thompson as a ' ~ u l t u r a l i s t ' . ~ ~  
While it is true, as Johnson, Perry Anderson, and others argue, that Thompson sacrifices 
analytical bite by refusing to include a more structural approach to the history of capitalist 
productive relations, i t  is not true, as the term 'culturalism' would indicate, that Thompson has 
relegated economics or productive relations to a secondary or derivative role. We have seen that 
Thompson's theoretical .statements imply, in spite of occasional explicit disavowals of economic 
determinism, that development of the capitalist mode of production is the fundamental underlying 
cause of the formation of the working class. Nor has Thompson neglected productive relations 
empirically in The Making. Chapters six through ten ('Exploitation', 'The Field Labourers', 
'Artisans and Others', 'The Weavers', 'Standards and Experiences') and significant portions of his 
account of Luddism in c h a p t i  fourteen are crammed with brilliant analyses of the economic life 
and productive relations of English workers. What distinguishes .these analyses is not so much 
their emphasis on culture -- although Thompson quite rightly insists on the inextricable 
interpenetration of culture and productive relations -- as their insistence on depicting productive' 
relations as lived human experiences rather than as abstract 'structures. Here, and throughout 
the book, Thompson resists abstraction and insists on recounting of all aspects of the 'making' of 
the English working class - whether economic, or cultural, or political, or religious, or social - 
exclusively from the perspective of concrete historical experiences. Thompson is not really a 
'culturalist' -- which implies someone who privileges cultural over other types of explanations. He 
is, rather, an 'experientiaiist', whose narrative perspective privileges the point of view of concrete 
historical agents over that of the theoretically self-conscious analyst. 
One indication that 'e~~enentialisrn'  rather than 'culturalism' is the appropriate label for 
Thompson's perspective is that his account of .the emergence of class consciousness -- a cultural 
change, after all -- suffers from the same lack of theoretical specification as his account of changes 
in productive relations. At the end of The Making we feel that class-conscious conceptualizations 
of' society and class-conscious protest movements have somehow arisen out of the .history 
Thompson has recounted, but it is not easy to specify precisely how and why. Class-conscious 
ideologies obviously included a reflection on the experience of exploitation so powerfully narrated 
in Part Two of The Making, but they were certainly not mere 'reflections' of that experience. 
They were also, it is clear, strongly influenced by the political traditions described in Part One 
('The Liberty Tree') and by the political struggles recounted in Part  Three ('The Working-Class 
Presence'). But how these influences and forces resulted in a particular cultural transforxriation - 
the emergence of class consciousness -- remains unclear. Instead, class consciousness appears in 
the early 1830s as the result of a tumultuous and inspiring but conceptually murky 'experience.' 
Reconstructing the Argument 
In reconstructing Thompson's argument, I shall make no attempt to indicate how - The 
Making could be improved by a more structural approach to the dynamics of capitalism; others 
have done that before. Instead, I shall attempt to supply what previous critiques have left out: a 
structural argument about the emergence of working-class consciousness -- one that is compatible 
with Thompson's narrative but that clarifies its conceptual foundations and theoretical 
~ i g ~ c a n c e .  What I say will also draw on my own study of France, where I see the emergence of 
class consciousness as having taken place in the same years as in England and by a remarkably 
33 sirnilar process. 
This reconstruction of Thompson's argument can usefully be focused on a much-disputed 
claim of his book: that the working class had really been 'made' by the early 1830s. This 
supposition is made plausible both by the feverish working class activity of the immediate post- 
Reform-Bill years, and by Chartist domination of English popular politics from the mid-thirties to 
the late forties. But doubts remain as to how definitive this 'making' was. Although Chartism 
was a mass movement of workers, its program and language were only very incompletely class 
conscious. Chartism concentrated on electoral reform, and its critique of monopoly and corruption 
were more trenchant than its critique of property relations. After the final collapse of Chartism in 
1848, English workers lapsed into a long period of conservatism, apathy, or narrow 'trade-union 
consciousness~. Rather than a definitive 'making' of the. working class in the early 1830s, it can 
be argued that the history of English workers is one of successive makings, unmakings, and 
r e m a k i r ~ ~ s . ~ ~  From this perspective, the achievements of 1790 to 1832 were not so impressive 
after all; they were not definitive, but reversible. Yet I think there was something special about 
the first. making that renders it more fundamental than any of the subsequent makings, 
unmakings, and remakings. To see why, however, will require some theoretical distinctions that 
take us beyond the purely experiential level of Thompson's own narrative. 
What does. Thompson mean when he claims the English working class was 'made' by the 
early 1830s? In the frrst place, the working class had defined itself as a class and had divided 
itself conceptually from the middle class. In doing so, it had developed a particular critique of 
capitalist society and property relations. It had, in short, developed a class discourse. At k e  
same time, it had developed a working-class movement. This movement had its distinct 
institutions (trade unions and confederations of trade unions, newspapers, clubs, and embryonic 
political parties such as the National Union of the- Working Class). In and around these working- 
class institutions, hundreds of thousands of workers were mobilized to struggle self-consciously for' 
working-class goals. The discourse and the movement were intimately linked: it was within the 
institutions of the working-class movement- that militants developed and disseminated working- 
class discourse; and it was the notions contained in working-class discourse that shaped and 
motivated the working-class movement. Thompson offers an intensely experiential narrative of 
the emerging working-class movement. But scattered through this narrative is a parallel account 
of the emergence of class discourse, an account that, in my opinion, needs more explicit theoretical 
formulation. 
What is Thompson's implicit theory of the emergence of working-class discourse? First, 
working-class discourse is a transformation of preexisting discourses. This is implied by the very 
organization of his book. Class conscious discourse does not arise -- as one might have gathered 
from Thompson's preface - purely as a reflection of and reflection on the exploitation of workers 
in capitalist productive relations. If this were the case, there would be little point in the long and 
impassioned discussion of pre-nineteenthcentury popular political traditions that occupies 
Thompson's first five chapters. These traditions were important because they contained notions 
that were transformed into a new working-class discourse around 1830. In other words, the 
political and religious traditions described in Part One, when subjected to the experience of 
exploitation described in Part Two, were transformed via the political agitations described in most 
of Part Three into the 'class consciousness' described in the final chapter. The fact that class 
discourse is a transformation of previously existing discourse has an important theoretical 
implication: it means that to explain the emergence of class discourse, we must understand the 
nature, the structure, and the potential contradictions of the previously existing discourses of 
which it is a transformation. 
Although understanding the genesis of class discourse requires a long chronological sweep, 
the actual emergence of class consciousness took place by a relatively sudden conceptuaI 
breakthrough during a period of intense political struggle. The suddenness of the breakthrough is 
in large part a consequence of the formal structure of the conceptual transformation itself: the 
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' emergence of working-class consciousness required a simultaneous transformation of two quite 
different previously existing discourses. 
In both England and France, working-class consciousness first emerged in the same period 
(the early 1830s), out of analogous political agitations (the Reform Bill crisis and the July 
-Revolution), and from strictly parallel conceptual  transformation^.^^ In both countries, the 
emergence of working-class discourse was a consequence of the breakdown of political alliances 
between workers and bourgeois following successful struggles against regimes dominated by 
landed aristocracies. In both cases, workers had every reason to feel that having carried the 
major burden of the battle against what they saw as a common aristocratic enemy, they were 
abandoned by the bourgeoisie (or the middle class, to use English terminology), who took all the 
spoils of victory for themselves. In. both cases, workers were shut out of the state by steep 
property requirements for the franchise, and saw their collectivist or mutualist goals pulverized by 
the patronizing and uncompromising individualism of the now dominant bourgeoisie. The shock of 
this betrayal led to a deep disillusionment with the bourgeoisie and an attempt to rethink and 
restate the workers' grievances. 
What resulted was a dual transformation of existing discourses. First, the workers' 
collectivism, which arose out the traditional discourse of trade and community solidarity, was 
universalized so as to encompass all workers. Because workers' traditional solidarities had been 
constituted in exclusivist trade and community terms, this meant developing a new vocabulary 
that instead emphasized the brotherhood of all workers. The obvious source of such a vocabulary 
was the discourse of individual rights and democratic participation in whose terms the joint 
struggle against the landed aristocracy had so recently been waged. But here a serious problem 
presented itself: in both its English and French variants, this discourse was so deeply individualist 
that it would not authorize the kinds of collective claims that workers were attempting to make. 
The universalization of traditional trade and community solidarities was based on a second 
transformation: .the radical or republican tradition was made compatible with collective claims. 
The centrality of private property in the radical tradition was challenged and replaced with some 
notion of collective control.' In both England and France, this was accomplished from two different' 
angles simultaneously. First, the right of individuals to associate freely in pursuit of common 
goals was invoked as a justification for collective organization to limit the destructive effects of 
competitive inckidualism. In England this was accomplished under the banner of 'cooperation', in 
France under the banner of 'association'. Second, the Lockean theory of property was 
reinterpreted so as to invest political rights not in property, which the Lockean tradition regarded 
as  a product of labor, but directly in labor itself. From this perspective, property became an 
abusive privilege that simultaneously exempted its idle owners from labor and (under existing 
suffrage laws) gave them a monopoly of political power as well. This logically interlocking 
complex of structural transformations created a working-class discourse that established a 
solidarity between workers of all trades, empowered workers to make collective claims about the 
character and products of productive activities, gave them a moral claim to political power, and 
stigmatized wealthy property owners as privileged and greedy monopolists. 
Once it had been achieved by both English and French workers in the early 1830s, this 
discursive transformation was remarkably durable. Class institutions could disintegrate or 
atrophy, and class conscious^ mass movements could be crushed or could lapse into apathy. But 
conceptual or discursive transformations are not so easily reversed. They are far less vulnerable 
to repression than'are class institutions, because they can be preserved intact by a tiny'cadre of 
militants, or in print, or in the memories of vast masses of workers. Thus preserved, they are 
immediately available when a more favorable conjuncture returns. Institutions must be painfully 
rebuilt, masses must be remobilized, but ideas do not have to be reinvented. Thus, the genie of 
class discourse, once created, proved very dficult to get back into the bottle. In this sense, 
Thompson was right to claim the English working class was in some important sense 'made' by 
the early 1830s, even though it was subsequently 'unmade' and 'remade' a t  the institutional level. 
But to see that this is true requires a theorization of Thompson's narrative of working-class 
formation in such a way that these different levels of 'making' can be distinguished. 
Conclusions 
These few words can hardly pretend to a complete theorization of The Making. But I think 
they indicate the direction which an adequate theory of working-class formation will have to take. 
Theoretical discussion of working-class formation cannot remain on a purely diachronic and 
experiential level. Numerous critics have pointed out that a clear understanding of the making of 
the English working class requires an account of the structural dynamics of early industrial 
capitalism. 'Similarly, understanding the emergence of class discourse in England and France in 
the early 1830s requires abstracting both the structure of class discourse and the structures of 
pre-existing discourses out of the experiences and the temporal sequences in which they exist. It 
also requires the elaboration of a synchronic transformational model of the logic posited to underlie 
the emergence of class discourse. Only by such a process of synchronic and structural abstraction, 
I would argue, can the true nature and consequences of the experienced history be understood. In 
particular, the sudden and simultaneous rather than gradual and piece-meal emergence of class 
. consciousness is a consequence of the logically interlocking character of the conceptual 
transformations. An adequate theory of class formation must include a dialectic between 
structural and experiential and between synchronic and diachronic moments. 
Theorizing the emergence of working-class discourse explicitly helps us to determine why 
'consciousness of class arises in the same way in different times and places, but never in just the 
same way'.36 If class discourse is a transformatiori of pre-existing discourses, then national 
differences in forms and content of class consciousness need not -be attributed purely to the 
vagaries of agency, nor purely to different patterns of capital accumulation, but also to differences 
in the nature of the discourses that were transformed into class consciousness. Thus, the much 
more pronounced socialism of French than of British working-class consciousness is probably in 
large part a consequence of the difference between French and British radical traditions. The 
centrality of private property as the touchstone of individual liberty in the ideology of the French 
Revolution made a critique of property absolutely central in ~ ; ench  workers' discourse, and the 
revolution's equation of productive work with the 'sovereignty of the people' and of idleness with 
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the counter-revolutionary 'aristocracy' almost invited workers to define property-owners as' 
aristocrats and enemies of the people.37 British radicalism, with its 'countxy party' heritage axid 
its powerful moral animus against corruption and monopoly gave rise, as Gareth Stedman Jones 
has demonstrated, to a quite different constellation of working-class political consc iousne~s .~~  
It is also very important to recognize that class discourse is only one of several discourses 
available to workers to conceptualize and act out their place in society and the state. Even 
workers involved in class institutions are interpellated (to use the Althusserian term) by various 
other discourses: unreconstructed radical democracy, reformist meliorism, self help, Toryism, 
nationalism, various religious ideologies, consumerism, and so on. These rival discourses may co- 
exist not only in the same class, but in the same mind; class discourse, once invented, does not 
necessarily remain the privileged discourse of workers. Which discourse prevails depends on 
changing political, economic, and social conjunctures. And while the invention of a given political 
discourse cannot be reversed, all such discourses are transformed in the course of historical 
experience. In extreme cases, such as the United States after World War II, class discourse can 
be so marginalized as to be virtually effaced. While class discourse may commonly have been 
more durable than class institutions in the nineteenth century, class movements have sometimes 
outlasted class discourse in the twentieth. 
A final conclusion: the process of class formation, or any other historical process, must be 
be conceptualized as an outcome of temporal conjunctures between multiple causal structures. 
Thompson's implicit notion that only productive relations have genuine causal power, while other 
apparent systems must be assimilated to the category of experience, .leads only to mystification 
and confusion. Whether one accepts the Althusserian formulation of a multitude of relatively 
autonomous levels or systems determined in the last instance by the economic base, or a more 
agnostic formulation that eschews any notion of final cause, is not important -- a question of 
metaphysics rather than of method. What matters is that one recognize the internal structure 
and dynamic, and hence the autonomous causal force, of each of the systems in question, as well 
as, of course, their mutual influence and systematic interrelations. Until some systematic and 
autonomous determinants beyond the mode of production are recognized and theorized, any 
attempt to transcend a base-superstructure model is illusory. 
In the case of English and French working-class formation, the emergence of class 
consciousness must be seen as resulting from a temporal conjunction of a t  least two systems: a 
system of capitalist productive relations in which labor in the handicraft trades undergoes a 
relentless formal subsumption to capital? and an  ideological system in which trade solidarity and 
radical notions of individual rights undergo a mutual transformation into a new discourse of class 
consciousness. Each system has independent causal power, and their conjunction is necessary to 
explain the historical emergence of class consciousness. In fact, to represent the emergence of 
class consciousness as resulting from the conjunction of only two systems -- economic and 
ideological -- would itself be a gross over-simplification. My own abbreviated account of 
developments in England and France actually signals the importance of another system: that of 
political alliances between classes. The emergence of class consciousness in both -countries 
followed a joint working-class and bourgeois political struggle against a landed aristocracy, in the 
course of which workers participated in institutions and ideologies of struggle that could be 
transformed into resources for a struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie when the 
original class alliance broke down. Once again, the structure and dynamic of class alliance had an 
independent causal force that cannot be reduced to a reflection of ideology or economics. The 
importance of a broken interclass political alliance for the development of working class 
consciousness also emerges from Sean Wilentz's study of New York City in the same era, where 
the parallels with England and France were remarkable.39 
The American case also suggests yet other systems with an important bearing on working- 
class formation. The nature of class consciousness was different in New York, where workers had 
long since g&ed the franchise, than in France and England where they were denied the vote; and 
whereas the development of working-class discourse and a working-class movement in London or 
Paris more or less guaranteed the national significance of the working-class political presence, this 
was by no metins true in the United States, where the highly regionalized federal political system 
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meant that developments in the premier city did not necessarily spread to the rest of the country. 
In short, a glance at the American case suggests the importance of state structure as an 
autonomous determinant of working-class formation. And the subsequent history of the American 
working class also suggests the importance of demographic structures: in a country where the 
labor force was growing far more rapidly than the natural increase of the population, the working- 
class was continually fed by a flood of European immigrants. Attempting to maintain a class- 
conscious workers movement in these circumstances was an altogether different matter than doing 
so in England, where the population grew more quickly than the labor force, or in France, where 
the industrial labor force itself grew only relatively slowly. Explaining the patterns of working- 
class formation in the various countries that underwent capitalist development in the nineteenth 
century will require a theoretical framework that can manipulate several different relatively 
autonomous causal systems simultaneously. 
But the point of all this theorizing is not to list the various causal systems that conspire in 
the process of class formation or to show how different permutations of their formal features will 
give us the the different types of working class movements and ideologies found in different 
European and North American countries. That would be a retreat into precisely the kind of 
. . 
dessicated formalism that Thompson drove from the.field when he published The Making. The 
point is to make possible the writing of more complex and satisfying histories of working classes, 
histories that embrace Thompson's vision of experience, diachrony, and agency in the historical 
process, but that elaborate the diachronic experience of agency in a continuing and acknowledged 
dialectic with synchronic structures of determination. For we cannot claim to know such 
synchronic structures of determination until we can show in circumstantial narratives how they 
shape and are shaped by real actors in experienced historical time. To believe that abstract 
theoretical generalizations are the end point of our enterprise would cast our lot with the ghost of 
the same sclerotic Stalinism that Thompson routed two decades ago -- when The Making awoke 
labor history from its long dogmatic slumbers. 
Belinda Davis, Geoff Eley, Howard Kirneldorf, Max Potter, and Joan Scott have provided 
generous intellectual assistance in the preparation of this paper. 
It should be noted that Thompson was by no means the only inspiration for my 
generation's embracing of 'history from below.' Such historians as Albert Soboul, George 
Rude, Richard Cobb, Eric Hobsbawm, Charles Tilly and Stephen Thernstrom also had an 
important impact. But Thompson's influence seems to me to have been the widest, 
deepest, and most lasting. 
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